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From Sterne and Borges to Lost 




Into what fictive realms can imagination 
translate you . . . ? 
W.H.  Auden, The Horatians1 
INTRODUCTION 
El Aleph, a short story by Jorge Luis Borges, was published in 
1945.2  In this story, Borges himself is one of the two central 
characters.  The other is an imaginary poet, Carlos Argentino 
Daneri, the cousin of Beatriz Viterbo, a woman Borges loved.  
After Beatriz dies, Borges visits her home each year on her 
birthday and spends time with Daneri and Beatrizs father.  On one 
of these melancholy occasions, Borges accidentally discovers the 
 
 ∗ Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, Haifa University.  The core of this Article is a paper 
presented in May of 2002, during the second European Conference of the International 
Society for Literature and Science, held at the University of Aarhus, Denmark.  The 
author is grateful to the participants in the conference for some insightful remarks, and to 
Ariel Bendor, Aaron Ben Zeev, Michael Birnhack, and Gabriel Zoran for important 
comments on early drafts of this Article and for fruitful conversations with them that 
contributed to the development of the authors ideas.  The author would also like to thank 
Pnina Alon and Lotem Pery for excellent research assistance and Rebecca Toueg for 
editorial comments. 
1 In W.H. AUDEN, CITY WITHOUT WALLS (1969). 
2  JORGE LUIS BORGES, The Aleph, in ALEPH AND OTHER STORIES 19331969 (Norman 
Thomas di Giovanni ed. & trans., 1978) (1945). 
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secret of the Aleph.  Daneri, seized with emotion, tells Borges that 
unscrupulous entrepreneurs intend to destroy his home and deprive 
him of the Aleph that he had discovered during his childhood in 
the cellar.  Without it, he would not be able to complete the long 
poem upon which he was working. The Aleph, as he explains to 
Borges, is one of the points in space that contains all other 
points.  It is the only place on earth where all places are seen 
from every angle.3 
Borges asks Daneri to show him the Aleph, and is given 
directions by Daneri as to how the connection is established.  
Daneri instructs Borges to descend to the cellar, lie flat on his 
back, focus his eyes on the nineteenth step, and wait a few 
moments.  He does so, and the Aleph appears.  How can it be 
described?  Borges writes: 
And here begins my despair as a writer. . . .  How, then, can 
I translate into words the limitless Aleph, which my 
floundering mind can scarcely encompass? . . .  What I 
want to do is impossible, for any listing of an endless series 
is doomed to be infinitesimal.4 
Today, fifty-five years after this enigmatic story appeared, we can 
all have a personal Aleph.  It is not as total as the Borgesian Aleph, 
but it leads towards an endless space.  It is the Internet.5  The 
Internet is not only a revolutionary technology.6  It also represents 
 
3 BORGES, supra note 2, at 15, 23. 
4 Id. at 26. 
5 For a similar use of the Borgesian Aleph as an image relevant to the Internet age, see 
generally GEORGE P. LANDOW, HYPERTEXT: THE CONVERGENCE OF CONTEMPORARY 
CRITICAL THEORY AND TECHNOLOGY 12 (1992). 
6 Today, it is hardly necessary to define the technology known as the Internet.  The 
author will, however, provide a short but elucidating description of the Internet, 
cyberspace, and the nature of navigating the Web by Justice Stevens: 
  The Internet is an international network of interconnected computers.  It is 
the outgrowth of what began in 1969 as a military program called 
ARPANET, which was designed to enable computers operated by the 
military, defense contractors, and universities conducting defenserelated 
research to communicate with one another by redundant channels even if some 
portions of the network were damaged in a war.  While the ARPANET no 
longer exists, it provides an example for the development of a number of 
civilian networks that, eventually linking with each other, now enable tens of 
millions of people to communicate with one another and to access vast amounts 
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some essential and far-advanced cultural shifts, as well as 
transformations in some of our social and cultural practices.  Such 
transformations inevitably influence many institutions. 
Before elaborating, it is important to understand that the 
Internet and all the various practical applications derived from it 
are associated with a broad range of meanings and influences.  The 
use of electronic mail, the search for answers to specific queries, 
scholarly research, political, commercial, and artistic uses all have 
unique significances and implications.  What follows is not an 
attempt to assemble the entire cluster of uses under a single overall 
perspective.  Instead, this essay attempts to suggest that one aspect 
of the Internet experience or the Internet culture is relevant to our 
narrative competence, cognizance, and ability to become 
storytellers and story listeners.  The Internet initiates and 
continuously induces important shifts in our storytelling practices 
and narrative cognizance.  These shifts carry significant 
implications in the domain of law.  They influence the way we 
practice law and the way we perceive it.  They affect our 
comprehension of law and the range of anticipations, hopes, and 
emotions related to it. 
 
of information from around the world.  The Internet is a unique and wholly 
new medium of worldwide human communication. 
 Anyone with access to the Internet may take advantage of a wide variety of 
communication and information retrieval methods.  These methods are 
constantly evolving and difficult to categorize precisely.  But, as presently 
constituted, those most relevant to this case are electronic mail (e-mail), 
automatic mailing list services (mail exploders, sometimes referred to as 
listservs), newsgroups, chat rooms, and the World Wide Web.  All of 
these methods can be used to transmit text; most can transmit sound, pictures, 
and moving video images.  Taken together, these tools constitute a unique 
mediumknown to its users as cyberspacelocated in no particular 
geographical location but available to anyone, anywhere in the world, with 
access to the Internet. 
. . . . 
 Navigating the Web is relatively straightforward.  A user may either type the 
address of a known page or enter one or more keywords into a commercial 
search engine in an effort to locate sites on a subject of interest.  A particular 
Web page may contain the information sought by the surfer, or, through its 
links, it may be an avenue to other documents located anywhere on the 
Internet. 
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 84952 (1997) (footnotes omitted). 
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I. LAW AND STORY 
Our social existence is organized around narratives.7  One 
could describe a significant part of human experience by using the 
image of an immense reservoir of narrative structures.  These 
structures produce meaning and organize different realms of 
reality.  Each narrative creates a distinct segment that can be 
grasped within the chaotic whole that surrounds us.  Practically, 
the narrative function is to construct the world not just according 
to how the world is, but according to its own categories.8 
Almost any social and cultural construct could be perceived as 
a collection of symbols that brings about an intellectual and 
emotional response.  But what is it that transforms certain 
expressions into a discernable collection of symbols?  How do 
disparate expressions cluster together and turn into the 
representation of a distinct phenomenon?  The issue is manifold, 
but one of the most important factors is narrative.9  An important 
function of narrative is the creation of organized constructs out of 
unorganized data fields.10  As Jonathan Culler elaborates: 
Stories, the argument goes, are the main way we make 
sense of things, whether in thinking of our lives as a 
progression leading somewhere or in telling ourselves what 
is happening in the world . . .  [Life] follows not a scientific 
logic of cause and effect but the logic of story, where to 
 
7 The definition of narrative, its substance, its functioning, and the relationship 
between it and the plot are issues that have attracted extensive research. See, e.g., MIEKE 
BAL, NARRATOLOGY: INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF NARRATIVE (Christine van 
Boheemen trans., 1985) (1980); PETER BROOKS, READING FOR THE PLOT: DESIGN AND 
INTENTION IN NARRATIVE (1984); JONATHAN CULLER, LITERARY THEORY 8394 (1997); 
GERALD PRINCE, NARRATOLOGY: THE FORM AND FUNCTION OF NARRATIVE (1982); 
SHLOMIT RIMMON-KENAN, NARRATIVE FICTION: CONTEMPORARY POETICS (1983). 
8 ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 116 (2000). 
9 See Goran Aijmer, The Symbolical Project, 13 CULTURAL DYNAMICS 66, 69 (2001) 
(The sphere of symbolic creation suggests studies of how textures of complex iconology 
are accomplished by an integration of less inclusive icons into ever more comprehensive 
symbolic clusters.  The grammar of such iconic imagemaking is one of architecture 
rather than syntax.  What we are dealing with is a sort of concrete . . . compositional 
process, a creation independent of mundane facts.). 
10 See, e.g., BROOKS, supra note 7, at 336; CULLER, supra note 7, at 8394; MICHAEL 
ROMER: TELLING STORIES: POSTMODERNISM AND THE INVALIDATION OF TRADITIONAL 
NARRATIVE (1995) (discussing the centrality of narrative in human experience). 
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understand is to conceive of how one thing leads to 
another, how something might have come about . . . .11 
The central role of narrative in creating concepts of self and 
society has become clear in a variety of fields, including those 
addressing law-related issues, such as race, community, gender, 
and the practice of law.12 
The discipline of law and literature constituted a significant 
contribution to the study of the links between law and narrative.13  
In his seminal work, The Legal Imagination, James Boyd White 
differentiates between the mind that tells a story and the mind 
that gives reason.14  A central act within the legal field is to 
master both sorts of discourse (both narrative and analysis) and 
put them to work, at the same time and despite their 
inconsistencies, in the service of a larger enterprise.15  The 
apparently impossible reconciliation between these discordant 
modes of thought and expression, these incompatible, 
uncommunicating, sides of oneself16 is one of the central acts of 
the legal mind, and one of the achievements of the legal 
imagination.  As Binder and Weisberg recently noted, a 
 
11 CULLER, supra note 7, at 8384. 
12 David M. Engel, Origin Myths: Narratives of Authority, Resistance, Disability, and 
Law, 27 LAW & SOCY REV. 785, 78990 (1993). 
13 See, e.g., SANDRA BERNS, TO SPEAK AS A JUDGE: DIFFERENCE, VOICE AND POWER 
(1999); ROBERT COVER, NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE AND THE LAW: THE ESSAYS OF ROBERT 
COVER (Martha Minow et al. eds., 1992); BERNARD S. JACKSON, LAW, FACT AND 
NARRATIVE COHERENCE (1991); LINDA H. LARUE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AS FICTION: 
NARRATIVE IN THE RHETORIC OF AUTHORITY (1995); LAWS STORIES: NARRATIVE AND 
RHETORIC IN THE LAW (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996); GARY MINDA, 
POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS: LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AT CENTURYS END 14966 
(1995); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE: THE LITERARY IMAGINATION AND 
PUBLIC LIFE (1995); DAVID RAY PAPKE, NARRATIVE AND THE LEGAL DISCOURSE (1991); 
BERT VAN ROERMUND, LAW, NARRATIVE AND REALITY (1997); THOMAS ROSS, JUST 
STORIES: HOW THE LAW EMBODIES RACISM AND BIAS (1996); BARRY R. SCHALLER, A 
VISION OF AMERICAN LAW: JUDGING LAW, LITERATURE AND THE STORIES WE TELL 
(1997); MICHAEL THOMPSON, REPRODUCING NARRATIVE: GENDER, REPRODUCTION AND 
LAW (1998); IAN WARD, LAW AND LITERATURE: POSSIBILITIES AND PERSPECTIVES 415 
(1996); ROBIN WEST, NARRATIVE, AUTHORITY AND THE LAW (4th ed. 1993). See also 
GUYORA BINDER & ROBERT WEISBERG, LITERARY CRITICISM OF LAW 20187 (2000) 
(offering a comprehensive survey of the law and literature related narrative discourse). 
14 JAMES BOYD WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION 859 (1973). 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
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substantial body of research in the sociology of law suggests that 
the portals of the law are guarded by narrative.17  According to 
Amsterdam and Bruners apt phrasing, Law begins . . . after 
narrative.18  Soon after entering laws portals, we inevitably 
encounter narratives once again; they are present wherever we go 
within laws domain. 
The next section suggests a preliminary narrative map that 
designates narrative spaces in the legal field, and illustrates the 
breadth of narrative influences and functions.  This Article will 
serve as a typology of the dependencies of law on narrative, and 
will manifest the ways in which law and narrative continuously 
intertwine.  This map suggests areas of legal practice that implicate 
two prominent forms of narrativity: generative narratives and 
functional narratives. 
II. GENERATIVE NARRATIVES 
Glanville Williams referred to law as a collection of symbols 
capable of evoking ideas and emotions, together with the ideas and 
emotions so evoked.19  What  force managed to unite certain 
expressions and transform them into symbols that represent  
law?  Can we locate, define, and describe the elusive moment 
when law emerged?  Derrida aptly expressed this query: How are 
we to distinguish between the force of law of a legitimate power 
 
17 BINDER & WEISBERG, supra note 13, at 24849. 
18 AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 8, at 283. 
19 Glanville Williams, Language and the Law, 61 LAW Q. REV. 71, 86 (1945) (It is 
impossible to make a sharp distinction between the various components included in his 
definition.  We need not dispute whether it is primarily symbol or primarily idea or 
primarily emotion; sometimes one, sometimes another aspect may be predominant, but 
usually all three are inseparably connected.). See also PAUL W. KAHN, THE REIGN OF 
LAW: MARBURY V. MADISON AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICA 3 (1997) (This myth of 
law is composed of an aggregation of ideas, values, and symbols linked by historical 
circumstance.); JOHN B. THOMPSON, CRITICAL HERMENEUTICS: A STUDY IN THE 
THOUGHT OF PAUL RICOEUR AND JURGEN HABERMAS 6 (1981) (referencing the primary 
significance of symbols: I am convinced that we must think, not behind the symbols, but 
starting from symbols, . . . that they constitute the revealing substrate of speech which 
lives among men.  In short, the symbol gives rise to thought.). 
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and the supposedly originary violence that must have established 
this authority?20 
Derrida emphasizes that violence characterized the moment of 
laws creation.  The key element is not violence but some kind of 
enchantment that is sometimes generated by words, by certain uses 
of language, and by the evocative power of a story.  This 
enchantment pertains to generative narratives, those stories that 
depict the transition from lawless existence into an existence that 
includes law in comprehensible terms.  Additionally, generative 
narratives can shape the way we imagine law and establish our 
expectations from the law, and they constitute potential ways of 
changing or reforming law. 
There are many modes of generative narratives.  Some are 
present in literatures classics.  One of the more famous plots of 
law emergence is the Oresteia, a trilogy by Aeschylus,21 which is 
comprised of three plays, Agamemnon, Choephori, and Eumenides.  
Orestes, the son of Agamemnon, kills his mother and her lover in 
revenge for the murder of his father.  He is pursued by the Furies, 
the avenging goddesses, and flees from Argos to Delphi and then 
to Athens.  The goddess Athena proposes settling the dispute by 
holding a tribunal on the Areopagus, and the first court of justice is 
founded.  Orestes is acquitted and is allowed to return to Argos.  
Athena has ended the circle of violence from which society had 
suffered for generations, and has founded a new order: the rule of 
law.22 
 
20 Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority, 11 
CARDOZO L. REV. 919, 927 (1990). 
21 AESCHYLUS, THE ORESTEIA OF AESCHYLUS (George Thompson ed., Adolf M. Hakkert 
1966) (458 B.C.E.). 
22 See, e.g., Patricia Ewick & Susan S. Silbey, Subversive Stories and Hegemonic 
Tales: Toward a Sociology of Narrative, 29 LAW & SOCY REV. 197, 212 (1995) 
(maintaining that narratives come to constitute the hegemony that in turn shapes social 
lives and conduct).  Yet, the same narratives can be subversive, and challenge the 
dominant social paradigm.  The way we perceive narratives depends on existing social 
conditions, disparities of power, and ideological effect. Id. at 222.  The complexity of 
generative narratives and their depth make them more prone to attract opposing, even 
dichotomizing, readings and understandings. See, e.g., MARIA ARISTODEMOU, LAW AND 
LITERATURE: JOURNEYS FROM HER TO ETERNITY 5880 (2000) (reading the Oresteia as a 
subversive narrative). 
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In what sense is the Oresteia relevant to contemporary legal 
discourse?  It is relevant in the same way literary classics are 
pertinent to human existence.  Italo Calvino, while describing this 
kind of relevance, refers to the classics of literature as works 
which exercise a particular influence, both when they imprint 
themselves on our imagination as unforgettable, and when they 
hide in the layers of memory disguised as the individuals or the 
collective unconscious.23 
Similar qualities characterize generative narratives that 
originate from other cultural sources, such as scripture, canonical 
works of philosophy, psychology or political thought, and 
significant historical events.  Following are several examples 
gathered from contemporary discourse. 
Austin Sarat describes how the biblical story of Akedah, the 
narrative of Abraham and his son Isaac, is enormously important 
for the ways this culture imagines law as well as fatherhood.24  
Milner S. Ball tells how biblical stories play an important role in 
the way we perceive the real world of law.25  Thus, the story of 
giving the law to Moses at Mount Sinai, and the way in which 
Moses represents both God and the Hebrew people at the same 
time, creates a major narrative of legal advocacy associated with 
the practice of modern lawyers.26  The story about Rachel weeping 
for her children, that transcends both law and morality,27 and 
Gods response, creates, according to Balls reading, a 
fundamental narrative relevant to laws capacity to accommodate 
things too deep for words28 and to contemporaneous legal issues, 
 
23 ITALO CALVINO, WHY READ THE CLASSICS? 4 (Martin McLaughlin trans., 1999) 
(1991). 
24 Austin Sarat, Imagining the Law of the Father: Loss, Dread, and Mourning in The 
Sweet Hereafter, 34 LAW & SOCY REV. 3, 12 (2000).  Sarat also draws on Freudian 
psychoanalytic theory to analyze how the psychoanalytic narrative of fatherhood called 
attention to the complex associations of paternity and legality. Id. at 13. See also Peter 
Goodrich, Maladies of the Legal Soul: Psychoanalysis and Interpretation in Law, 54 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1035, 1047 (1997) (Freud and those who follow him depict a law 
that is modeled upon the power of the father.  They elaborate a symbolic order that is 
patriarchal in its norms and methods.). 
25 MILNER S. BALL, CALLED BY STORIES 4 (2000). 
26 Id. at 921. 
27 Id. at 89. 
28 Id. at 1. 
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such as the role of emotion in the judicial process.29  As Ball 
emphasizes, though the first audience of the biblical narratives is 
their first communities, Jews and Christians, those narratives have 
never been limited to religious communities and were not meant to 
be.  Their fundamental and freeing30 qualities are available to 
any audience, anytime, and to present-day legal discourse. 
To use J. Hillis Millers phrasing, all sorts of generative 
narratives, whether their source is literary, religious, historic, or 
any other, manifest a peculiar and unexpected relation between 
the affirmation of universal moral law and storytelling.31  As 
Miller elucidates, it would seem that the connection of such a law 
to any particular narrative or to narration at large would be 
adventitious, or superficial, but in actual fact, ethics and narration 
cannot be kept separate, not because stories contain the thematic 
dramatization of ethical situations, choices and judgments . . . [but] 
because ethics itself has a peculiar relation to that form of language 
we call narrative.32 
In other words, narratives transform abstract constructs or 
formulas into expressions loaded with ethical meaning.  Without 
the presence of some kind of validating narrative in the 
background, the law and the norm are like empty shells, with no 
intelligible ethical substance within.33 
 
29 Ball intersects the biblical narrative with specific situations, such as a plant closing 
and the subsequent movement of jobs to Mexico and legal disputes over the sovereignty 
of native Hawaiians. Id. at 81105. 
30 Id. at 6. 
31 J. HILLIS MILLER, THE ETHICS OF READING 2 (1987). 
32 Id. at 3.  Miller also comments on the complex character of the links between moral 
law and narrative: [T]he moral law gives rise by an intrinsic necessity to storytelling, 
even if that storytelling in one way or another puts in question or subverts the moral law. 
Id. at 2. See also Ewick & Silbey, supra note 22, at 222 (regarding the subversive 
potential of narratives). 
33 Here lies another intricate conceptual difficulty, which is highly relevant to both law 
and literature: What endows a particular articulation authoritative nature?  J. Hillis Miller, 
while addressing the legislative powers of narrative, aptly phrases the question: Both 
law and literature depend on resolving (or tacitly avoiding) the vexed question of the 
validity of example, or, in traditional rhetorical terms, the validity of synecdoche, part 
standing for whole.  J. HILLIS MILLER, TOPOGRAPHIES 82 (1995).  Up to a certain point, 
that mysterious metamorphosis is precisely what law does when it transforms the 
individual case into norm, or, to use Millers terms, crowns a synecdoche with general 
validity. 
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Law needs narratives in order to resolve oppositions of all 
kinds and to maintain a constant acknowledgment of its legitimacy 
and authority.  As Robert Cover put it, For every constitution 
there is an epic, for each decalogue a scripture . . . law and 
narrative are inseparably related.  Every prescription is insistent in 
its demand to be located in discourseto be supplied with history 
and destiny, beginning and end, explanation and purpose.34  Every 
legal regime draws legitimacy and authority from some generative 
narrative. 
Generative narratives are continually activated in our 
consciousness even if no direct reference is made to them during 
the daily function of laws machinery.  Around them, we keep 
accumulating symbols, knowledge, and other stories, both new and 
recurring, that are associated with the idea of law.35  Some version 
of generative narrative continuously maintains our perception of 
law.  Generative narratives contain a unique element of vitality that 
remains ever operative and that continuously maintains 
apperception which is, following Paul Lehman, the uniquely 
human capacity to know something without knowing how one has 
come to know it.36 
Secondary generative narratives shape and define legal 
categories, or the different legal concepts and principles.  Law rests 
on narrative to make sense of basic, organizing legal ideas.  Thus, 
for instance, in order to conceive the notions of liability and 
responsibility, we must employ organizing narratives.  As Binder 
and Weisberg explain, an assignment of casual responsibility 
involves a short chain of casual explanation, a simple narrative 
linking a harmful result to a blameworthy character.37  Similarly, 
there is the narrative of property (this is mine, so I can do whatever 
I want with it), narrative of contracts (I reached an agreement with 
you, and agreements must be honored), and the narrative of 
 
34 COVER, supra note 13, at 96. 
35 Modes of generative narrative are also created within our personal experience. Cf., 
Engel, supra note 12 (showing how parents of disabled children tell similar stories about 
the first day of diagnosis).  These origin narratives confront law and myth, empower 
parents, and help them to negotiate their way through legal and educational systems. 
36 PAUL LEHMANN, THE DECALOGUE AND A HUMAN FUTURE: THE MEANING OF THE 
COMMANDMENTS FOR MAKING AND KEEPING HUMAN LIFE HUMAN 23 (1994). 
37 BINDER & WEISBERG, supra note 13, at 264. 
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constitutional law (we need to define and protect superior norms to 
maintain social order), and so on. 
Some of the secondary generative narratives are created by 
historical occurrences.  Thus, the constitutional narratives of 
America include stories about the colonies quest for religious 
freedom and the stories of slavery and civil war.  It is hard to 
imagine conveying the principles of American constitutional law 
without these stories.  However, generative narratives often contain 
a subversive seed, and carry the potential not only to entrench 
hegemony, but also to deconstruct it.  The slavery story, for 
example, can be perceived as a story that strengthens law, and 
defines it as a practice that can rectify itself.  On the other hand, 
the same story can be perceived as a constant reflection of laws 
failure to address injustice.38  Be that as it may, the opposed 
understandings illuminate the unique properties of the narrative 
mode of knowing: its potential to validate, while constantly 
challenging, our cultural practices. 
III. FUNCTIONAL NARRATIVES 
Functional narratives are the stories that penetrate and facilitate 
numerous aspects of daily legal activities.  In their classic article, 
The Emergence and Transformation of Dispute: Naming, Blaming, 
Claiming . . . ,39 Felstiner, Abel, and Sarat describe legal claims as 
a process motivated and activated by narrative.  In order to pursue 
a claim despite the burdens and risks involved, claimants must 
characterize themselves as grievants, identify antagonists and 
compose a quest in which they are called to enlist and fight 
injustice.  This process of narrative framing is essential to the 
functioning of the legal machinery.40  Many other legal activities 
depend upon the ability to identify plots and manipulate stories or 
to employ functional narratives. 
 
38 ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 201 (1981).  For 
a detailed discussion of the manifold facets of the slavery story, see BINDER & WEISBERG, 
supra note 13, at 26887. 
39 William L. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Dispute: Naming, 
Blaming, Claiming . . . , 15 LAW & SOCY REV. 631 (1981). 
40 Id. 
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Functional narratives come in many variations and their impact 
can be described in different modes.  As an example, the legal 
argument relies on selective arrangements of events in narrative 
forms.  Competing stories are told about the same events, 
reflecting competing interests. Thus, for instance, the aim of the 
prosecutor in a criminal trial is to present a certain chronology of 
events in a manner that will convince the judge or jurors that the 
accused indeed carried out a certain crime.  The aim of the defense 
lawyer is to present a different chronology of events which refutes 
the conclusion that the accused committed the crime.  After 
coming to a decision, the judge creates her own narrative in her 
judgment. 
Functional narratives are used and interpreted incessantly by 
plaintiffs and defendants, accused and witnesses, lawyers, and 
jurors.  Different functional narratives are employed in different 
areas of the legal arena.  Trial narratives are told differently from 
plea bargaining narratives41 and different courtroom actors (judge, 
jurors, prosecutor, defense attorney, witnesses) manifest different 
kinds of storytelling and story-listening abilities.42 
Further demonstrating the inevitability of the narrative mode of 
knowing within the legal field, judges also activate functional 
narratives.  Adjudication might be described by using narrative 
terms; a judge who looks at a particular case is actually facing an 
idiosyncratic story.  Taking this story, and discarding several 
layers of it until the core narrative is exposed, the judge then fits 
this exposed core narrative to one of the existing narrative 
templates.  For example, there is a narrative template that refers to 
first-degree murder and another one that refers to manslaughter.  
The judicial process determines how to treat the unique story and 
the court decides if it conforms with the murder narrative template 
or with the manslaughter one.  Judging, in this sense, means 
assessing stories. 
 
41 Douglas M. Maynard, Narratives and Narrative Structure in Plea Bargaining, 22 
LAW & SOCY REV. 449, 479 (1988). 
42 W. LANCE BENNET & MARTHA FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTING REALITY IN THE 
COURTROOM: JUSTICE AND JUDGMENT IN AMERICAN CULTURE, at ix (1981). 
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This brings to mind Vladimir Propps work in The Morphology 
of Folktale, where he isolated and identified the basic units of 
narratives and the principles of their combination.43  In a way, 
some of laws practices are similar.  Law takes as basic data all the 
known stories concerning human behavior, isolates the primary 
units of those stories, and determines the possible combinations 
and their ensuing results.  Judges compare the narratives brought 
before them to the primary list of narrative templates.  They match 
disparate stories and discover parallels and similarities, as well as 
the dissimilarities.  Each and every individual case is deconstructed 
and transformed into a labeled narrative.  One story becomes 
negligent act, another becomes criminal offense, and so on.  
Judging, in a sense, is really a matter of sorting out and identifying 
narratives and inferring their legal consequences.44 
In other words, judges confront cases as competing stories, and 
sift through precedents and through their own internal stories, in 
search of sufficiently similar narratives, in order to facilitate the 
categorization of each case.45  Next, in the written judgment, they 
transform the chosen story into a new one that combines the 
template story they chose with the unique character of any specific 
 
43 VLADIMIR PROPP, MORPHOLOGY OF THE FOLKTALE (Louis A. Wagner ed., Laurence 
Scott trans., 2d ed. 1968) (1928). 
44 In this kind of narrative discourse, the surplus informationthe data that does not fit 
the narrative templateis not valueless and has important functions.  Each storys 
particular details endow it with its unique character and special impact.  The fact that Red 
Riding Hood wore a red riding hood is perhaps redundant to the narrative template that is 
linked to her story, but this detail etches the story in our collective memory.  In a similar 
way, O.J. Simpsons identity is redundant to the several templates that are connected to 
his case, but the specific identity of Simpson makes those templates stand out and 
activates our emotional and ideological responses to them.  Interview with Gabriel Zoran, 
Professor of Literature and Comparative Literature, in Haifa, Isr. (Nov. 2001). 
45 One authors description of this process: 
But once you tell your story into the law, it becomes the object of a precise 
semantic dissection.  The whole of the story is of no interest; instead, patient 
surgeons of language wait and watch, snip and assay, looking for certain 
phrases, certain words.  Particular locutions trip particular legal switches, and 
set a heavy machine in motion. 
D. GRAHAM BURNETT, A TRIAL BY JURY 4546 (2001). See also BENNET & FELDMAN, 
supra note 42, at 64 (This theory of stories . . . explains how ordinary persons can make 
sophisticated judgments about complex information . . . .).  Bennet and Feldman contend 
that stories, for the jury, are much more than a descriptive tool, organizing constructs 
enabling the evaluating and judging of complex situations. 
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case.  The narratives created at this stage are intended not only to 
deliver the normative guideline (such as acquittal or conviction and 
sentence), but also to specify the factual grounds relevant to the 
normative guideline, and to persuade the audience of its 
correctness and inevitability. 
The judicial style applied in countries with legal systems 
originating in the common law permits judges, and even appellate 
judges who generally are not responsible for fact finding, 
significant freedom of narrative and rhetoric.  Judges elaborate 
upon or redact the survey of relevant facts based on all the 
circumstances of the case and their personal style and choices.46  In 
several Continental legal systems, the judicial style is different.  It 
is as concise as possible, lacks personal tones, and the narrative 
descriptions tend to be minimalist.47  This distinction apparently 
ensues from a basic difference between the Continental and Anglo-
American systems of law.  Whereas the former is primarily based 
on doctrine, the latter has developed from case law that is based 
on precedents and judicial decisions.  In a legal system with such 
an orientation, great importance is placed on the details of the 
narrative that underlie very precedent.48 
However, even within the systems that tend to minimize the 
use of overt narrativity in judgments, in legal doctrine, or even in 
the legal culture at large, the fundamental legal functions of 
assessing and processing stories are ever present.  The difference 
in external manifestations of narrative style does not influence the 
 
46 See Bernard S. Jackson, Narrative Theories and Legal Discourse, in NARRATIVE IN 
CULTURE: THE USES OF STORYTELLING IN THE SCIENCES, PHILOSOPHY, AND LITERATURE 
2350 (Christopher Nash ed., 1990) (illustrating the connections between the content and 
materials of the narrative and the legal outcome in English case law); Esin Orucu, Mixed 
and Mixing Systems: A Conceptual Search, in STUDIES IN LEGAL SYSTEMS: MIXED AND 
MIXING 33552 (Esin Orucu et al. eds., 1996) (elaborating on the manner of writing in 
the common law legal systems). 
47 See MARY ANN GLENDON ET AL., COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS 135 (1982) 
(pointing out the extreme brevity of the statement of facts in the cryptic judgments of 
the French Court of Cassation); Orucu, supra note 46 (reviewing the differences in this 
connection between the common law and Continental legal systems and considering the 
historical reasons for these differences). 
48 See Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of Law: Toward A Sociology of the Juridical Field, 
38 HASTINGS L.J. 805, 82223 (1987) (describing this distinction between the systems). 
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essentiality of narrative cognizance within any given legal 
system.49 
Undoubtedly, the relationship between law and narrative is 
manifold and ambivalent.  As Sarat points out, the connections 
between law and language and the perception of the law as a 
literary occupation may be seen by some as threatening because 
they emphasize the manipulative aspects of the law and raise 
arguments concerning its unswerving objectivity.50  Indeed, law as 
a system of adjudication cannot allow a free narrative flow.  A 
narrator who enters a legal field is never permitted to roll out a 
story, freely and fully, according to style, need, or talent.  Law has 
numerous tools that assume narrative monitoring functions.  
Among these tools are the rules of procedure and evidence, the 
rigid structures of legal doctrines and legal documentation, and 
conventions that form our expectations from law as well as laws 
limitations.  Formally, law is not interested in narratives as such, 
but in certain facts that generate certain legal outcomes.  Yet, in 
spite of those reservations, it seems that the use of narrative in 
various forms and manifestations is intrinsic to law. 
IV. INTENET AND NARRATIVE: VANISHING STORIES IN VIRTUAL 
SPACE 
People are turning to their computers in their search for 
knowledge with greater regularity.  The Internet offers a reservoir 
of data, which, for all practical purposes, may be termed infinite, 
as it is multiplying every minute.  In fact, it is impossible to 
completely understand or grasp the entire data array.51  In 
 
49 It should be noted that a decision to negate a particular dimension of the narrative, 
such as by creating one that is tabula rasa, is actually a form of interpretation and 
manipulation.  Since it prevents those exposed to the blank narrative from seeing the facts 
in a certain manner, it necessarily drives them in a different direction.  Thus, lean 
narratives can be as effective, interpretive, and manipulative as generous ones. 
50 Austin Sarat, Editorial Introduction, in THE RHETORIC OF LAW 1 (Austin Sarat & 
Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1994). 
51 Recently, attempts have been made to measure the amount of information produced 
in the world each year.  A research study carried out by the School of Information 
Management and Systems at the University of California at Berkeley concluded that the 
worlds total yearly production of print, film, optical, and magnetic content would require 
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many cases, the Internet is an extremely useful and timesaving 
practical tool, whether one needs to find information, to 
communicate, or to engage in artistic endeavors.  Furthermore, the 
Internet is a main source of recreation, as people spend more and 
more time at their screens in order to be entertained. 
Whatever the motivation may be for using the Internet, and 
whatever link we choose to follow, we are never at the beginning, 
middle, or end of anything, but always at some contingent point 
that cannot be located on a chronological continuum, nor in any 
other kind of defined space or construct.  The Web offers a 
practically endless flux that is entirely at our disposal, although 
entirely in this context could mean nothing.  The effect of 
exposure to the constant flow of data could be the loss of ability to 
distinguish any defined or meaningful sections within it.  This 
characterization of the Internet is highly relevant to narrative 
cognizance. 
One way to comprehend how narrative works is to focus upon 
its apparent claim to rescue meaning from temporal flux.52  
Narrative creates a structure that refers to different dimensions of 
time, to the link between the past and what exists in another 
temporal dimension.  This creates the narratives peculiar relation 
to beginnings and ends.53  Even when we deal with a non-linear 
narrative that makes use of means such as deviations and retreats, 
the awareness of some kind of temporal axis is preserved.  The 
 
roughly 1.5 billion gigabytes of storage.  This is the equivalent of 250 megabytes per 
person for each man, woman, and child on earth.  These numbers are increasing and some 
are even doubled every year.  Until 2000, the amount of information accumulated all over 
the world was 12 billion gigabytes.  The Internet is one of the fastest growing media in 
todays world.  The research shows that the static, publicly available Web pages (the 
surface Web) consist of approximately 2.5 billion documents, up from 1 billion pages 
at the beginning of the year, with a rate of growth of 7.3 million pages per day.  The total 
amount of information on the surface Web varies somewhere from 25 to 50 terabytes 
of information.  It seems that we cannot practically handle this amount of information.  
Hal R. Varian, who carried out this research with Peter Lyman, concludes that we are 
drowning in a sea of information.  Better understanding and better tools are desperately 
needed if we are to take full advantage of the ever-increasing supply of information and 
to swim in it, rather than drown. See Peter Lyman & Hal R. Varian, How Much 
Information? (2000), at http://www.sims.berkeley.edu/research/projects/how-much-info/ 
(last visited Nov. 19, 2002). 
52 BROOKS, supra note 7, at 90. 
53 Id. 
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temporal structures can be intricate.  Christain Metz describes the 
doubly temporal sequence of the narrative: there is the time of the 
thing told and the time of the telling.54  This duality enables us to 
create a special narrative time, e.g., three years of a heros life 
summed up in two sentences, etc., but it also shows the unique 
ability of the narrative: 
[I]t invites us to consider that one of the functions of 
narrative is to invent one time scheme in terms of another 
time schemeand that is what distinguishes narrative from 
simple description (which create space in time), as well as 
from the image (which creates one space in another 
space).55 
This distinction, between the story and the image, is highly 
relevant to the Internet experience.  The Web deeply affects our 
ability to focus upon the temporal.  It is the essential character of 
the Web that denies us the option of finalizing the claim to define 
meaning out of chaos.  The result is deterioration of the ability to 
create and observe narrative structures that need some sense of 
temporality. 
Contrarily, it has been suggested that the multiplicity, 
polyphony, and dynamics that characterize the Web are actually 
fertile grounds for a new kind of narrative discourse.  According to 
this contention, the Internet forms a contemporary, non-linear, 
even anti-linear narrative, which every user shapes interactively 
and creatively according to their personal narrative needs, desires, 
urges, and preferences; in this perception, the Internet is actually a 
vast emporium of stories.  It offers us choices from an endless 
range of plots.  Every site is, in this sense, a story or many stories 
presented for our perusal.  Indeed, some hypertext theorists, such 
as Richard A. Lanham56 and George P. Landow,57 imagine new 
forms of discourse that make readers more active participants.  
Other theorists recognize the danger of getting lost in 
 
54 Christain Metz, Notes Toward a Phenomenology of the Narrative, in THE NARRATIVE 
READER 87 (Martin McQuillan ed., 2000). 
55 Id. 
56 RICHARD A. LANHAM, THE ELECTRONIC WORD: DEMOCRACY, TECHNOLOGY AND THE 
ARTS (1993). 
57 LANDOW, supra note 5. 
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informational anarchy.58  This danger is related to the undermining 
of narrative consciousness initiated by the Internet experience.  
Even if all the narrative components are floating in virtual space, 
meaningful narratives are not created in the majority of cases.  
Generally, the Internet does not turn into an emporium of stories 
because its very nature contradicts narrative discourse. 
The Internet urges the user to constantly move forward in order 
not to miss the next image, the next screen, the next site, the next 
stimulation.  Using the Internet is like being in a perpetual state of 
searching, in an endless chase that will rarely shape itself into any 
organizing insight.  However, it is important to emphasize that 
neither the interactivity nor the anti-linearity that characterize 
certain aspects of the Internet experience necessarily impairs 
narrativity. 
Interactivity could become an enriching element in any 
narrative.  Laurence Sterne writes about the ways in which the 
narratees active participation is achieved in The Life and Opinions 
of Tristram Shandy, a celebrated tour de force that is a masterly 
constructed early hypertext: 
 Writing, when properly managed, (as you may be sure I 
think mine is) is but a different name for conversation: as 
no one, who knows what he is about in good company, 
would venture to talk all; so no author, who understands the 
just boundaries of decorum and good breeding, would 
presume to think all: The truest respect which you can pay 
to the readers understanding, is to halve this matter 
amicably and leave him with something to imagine, in his 
turn, as well as yourself. 
 For my own part, I am eternally paying him 
compliments of this kind, and do all that lies in my power 
to keep his imagination as busy as my own.59 
 
58 Henry Jenkins, The Work of Theory in the Age of Digital Transformation, in A 
COMPANION TO FILM THEORY 234, 247 (Toby Miller & Robert Stam eds., 1999). 
59 LAURENCE STERNE, THE LIFE AND OPINIONS OF TRISTRAM SHANDY, GENTLEMAN 83 
(Ian Watt ed., 1965). 
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Sterne uses the concepts of digression and progression to 
illustrate the intricate course along which he maneuvers his 
writing.  In The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy, 
progression, the chronological advance of the main plot along the 
Kings Highway, is constantly delayed due to innumerable and 
fascinating detours, leading to side-roads and by-roads called 
digressions, which Sterne loves: Digressions, incontestably, are 
the sunshine;they are the life, the soul of reading;take them 
out of this book for instance,you might as well take the book 
along with them;one cold eternal winter would reign in every 
page of it.60 
There is nothing contingent about digressions, however.  They 
must be controlled and carefully planned.  Progressions and 
digressions imply that when a man is telling a story . . . he is 
obliged continually to be going backwards and forwards to keep all 
tight together in the readers fancy.61  Keeping all tight together 
in the readers fancy is the heart of the matter.  Narrative that 
works, even when it has digressive detouring or jumpy 
dimensions, eventually leads our imagination towards one 
expression, potent enough to evoke significant ideological and 
emotional responses.  A mere sequence of data, facts, images, or 
links does not create a story, and does not produce such a response. 
Narrative is a construct, although it is potentially hidden and 
complex.  It need not be orderly, yet it must have some internal 
order, and must possess proportions that conform to the sphere of 
human activity.  The Internet creates an articulate overflowing of 
words that lacks internal order.  Its proportions and substance 
prevent us from grasping it as a whole or generating particular 
narratives from it.62 
 
60 Id. at 55. 
61 Id. at 351. 
62 That point could be illustrated by referring to the hermeneutic circle.  According to 
this image, the meaning of a part must be based on the understanding of an entirety in 
which the part belongs.  But if one cannot understand the whole without understanding 
the parts, and the part cannot be understood without knowing its relationship with the 
whole, the result is a tautology: one cannot understand the whole without understanding 
the whole. See Hans-Georg Gadamer, On the Circle of Understanding, in HERMENEUTICS 
VERSUS SCIENCE?: THREE GERMAN VIEWS: ESSAYS 6878 (John M. Connolly & Thomas 
Keutner eds. & trans., 1988) (1954). 
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There is a significant difference between active and creative 
conversation, to use Sternes expression, and the interactivity 
associated with the Internet.  In the former instance, narrative 
invokes responses created and constructed for our consumption.  
The conversation that readers conduct with the writer has no 
influence upon the finality of the text with which they are dealing.  
The story remains intact, ready to stimulate further conversations 
with further readers.  Usually, the interactivity of web users does 
not evolve into a conversation between narrators and readers 
because it does not stem from a constructed, final narrative.  The 
interactivity of Internet users operates in an open-ended system 
that denies the possibility of closure and hence, the probability of 
the creation of an effective story.  The never-ending quality of the 
Internet is actually anti-narrative in nature.  Interactivity applied in 
an anti-narrative environment lacks the potency necessary to create 
a story.63 
V. LAW AND WEB 
A. Law in an Anti-Narrative Environment: Overdose of Simulacra 
and Legal Stories 
What the Internet produces by the endless stream of changing 
sights, images, and copies is actually an extreme manifestation of 
simulacra.  The perception of the simulacrum was developed by 
several thinkers, among them Jameson,64 Baudrillard,65 and 
 
63 It is worth mentioning that some Internet theorists have pursued the notion that a new 
concept of construct will eventually emerge: 
In this shifting electronic space, writers will need a new concept of structure.  
In place of a closed and unitary structure, they must learn to conceive of their 
text as a structure of possible structures.  The writer must practice a kind of 
second-order writing, creating coherent lines for the reader to discover without 
closing off the possibilities prematurely or arbitrarily.  This writing of the 
second order will be the special contribution of the electronic medium to the 
history of literature. 
JAY DAVID BOLTER, WRITING SPACE: THE COMPUTER, HYPERTEXT, AND THE HISTORY OF 
WRITING 144 (1991). See also LANDOW, supra note 5, at 10307. 
64 Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, 146 NEW 
LEFT REV. 53 (1984). 
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Deleuze and Guattari.66  It refers to contemporary culture as a 
continuous flow of images or copies whose relation to the model 
has become so attenuated that it can no longer properly be said to 
be a copy.67  The perception that has often been applied in the 
field of modern art critique quickly became relevant to popular 
culture and contemporary culture at large, as well as the domain of 
contemporary media.  When the electronic media provides us with 
an incessant flow of news, images, pictures, and speech, we are 
offered endless repetitions.  Reality, truth, integrity, and 
authenticity are terms that lose tangible meaning within the 
simulacrum.  The simulacrum also devours narrative structure, 
which must cling to some primary authentic model in order to be 
effective, because narrative means representation, not simulation. 
The simulacra phenomenon has pre-Internet manifestations.  
In his seminal essay, The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical 
Reproduction, Walter Benjamin surveys the gradual development 
of our ability to duplicate: 
The enormous changes which printing, the mechanical 
reproduction of writing, has brought about in literature are 
a familiar story.  However, within the phenomenon which 
we are here examining from the perspective of world 
history, print is merely a special, though particularly 
important, case. . . . 
 . . . Just as lithography virtually implied the illustrated 
newspaper, so did photography foreshadow the sound film.  
The technical reproduction of sound was tackled at the end 
of the last century.  These convergent endeavors made 
predictable a situation which Paul Valéry pointed out in 
this sentence: Just as water, gas, and electricity are 
brought into our houses from far off to satisfy our needs in 
response to a minimal effort, so we shall be supplied with 
 
65 JEAN BAUDRILLARD, SIMULACRA AND SIMULATION (Sheila Faria Glaser trans., 1994) 
(1981). 
66 GILLES DELEUZE & FÉLIX GUATTARI, ANTI-OEDIPUS (Robert Hurley et al. trans., 
1977) (1972). 
67 Brian Massumi, Realer Than Real: The Simulacrum According to Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1 COPYRIGHT (1987), available at http://www.anu.edu.au/HRC/first_and_last/ 
works/realer.htm (n.d.). 
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visual or auditory images, which will appear and disappear 
at a simple movement of the hand, hardly more than a 
sign.68 
Benjamin also writes about the blurring of distinctions between 
authors and their audience in the age of mass press, the changes in 
temporal perceptions caused by the emergence of film, and the 
way in which sequences of moving pictures distract the mind and 
affects the ability to develop valid assessments and judgments.69  
All of these characterize the Internet experience.  In concurrence 
with Benjamins ideas, much as the photographing techniques 
carried the seed of the cinema technology, the technological 
developments of the previous century carried the seed of the 
Internet phenomenon.  Yet, the Internet created unique and 
unprecedented manifestations.70 
 
68 Walter Benjamin, The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction, in VIDEO 
CULTURE: A CRITICAL INVESTIGATION 27, 2829 (John G. Hanhardt ed., 1986) (footnote 
omitted). 
69 In another essay, Benjamin writes about the gradual fading of stories, a phenomenon 
which he relates to the invention of print, and to the blossom of the novel in the modern 
age: 
[T]he art of storytelling is coming to an end.  Less and less frequently do we 
encounter people with the ability to tell a tale properly.  More and more often 
there is embarrassment all around when the wish to hear a story is expressed.  It 
is as if something that seemed inalienable to us, the securest among our 
possessions, were taken from us: the ability to exchange experiences. 
Walter Benjamin, The Storyteller: Reflections on the Works of Nikolai Leskov, in 
ILLUMINATIONS 83 (H. Arendt ed., H. Zohn trans., 1968) (1936). 
70 There are different attitudes to the distinction between the Internet and the 
technologies that preceded it, and to the need for legal modifications.  As Stuart Biegel 
describes: 
At one end of the spectrum are those who recognize occasional differences, 
conceding in certain limited cases that some new rules and regulations may be 
necessary.  Others may go much further, arguing that todays networked 
computer environment is different enoughboth in its design and in the nature 
of the online activity that takes placeto merit new and different approaches to 
regulatory issues that inevitably arise.  Finally, at the other end of the spectrum, 
are those who would go so far as to argue that the online world is 
metaphysically both a different place and time, transcending commonly 
accepted notions of geography and duration. 
STUART BIEGEL, BEYOND OUR CONTROL? CONFRONTING THE LIMITS OF OUR LEGAL 
SYSTEM IN THE AGE OF CYBERSPACE  31 (2001) (citing Paul Valéry, The Conquest of 
Ubiquity, in AESTHETICS 226 (Ralph Manheim trans., 1964) (1928)). 
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Baudrillard uses the term hyperspace in order to characterize 
the American deserts he traveled.71  The essence of this 
hyperspace, wrote Baudrillard, is the disappearance of all 
aesthetic and critical forms of life in the irradiation of an objectless 
neutrality.72  A similar characterization could be attributed to the 
virtual hyperspace, the desert of the Internet.  In this realm, any 
claim of authority and legitimacy is in the nature of a fata 
morgana, or mirage.  Any moment of authority is an illusionary 
image that will soon fade and vacate its place for the next image in 
the endless cycle of the electronic simulacrum. 
This loss of authority and legitimacy carries special importance 
when we reach the realm of law.  As Franco Moretti wrote: 
It is not enough that the social order is legal; it must also 
appear symbolically legitimate. . . .   
 . . . It is . . . necessary that . . . one perceives the social 
norms as ones own.  One must internalize them and fuse 
external compulsion and internal impulses into a new unity 
until the former is no longer distinguishable from the latter.  
This fusion is what we usually call consent or 
legitimation.73 
Indeed, the legal system, any legal system, derives its power from 
symbolic legitimacy based upon social consent and legitimacy that 
grew and developed during a long and complex apprenticeship 
process.  This never-ending process requires the use of stories.  
Narratives constantly sustain and nourish the laws authority, while 
the simulacrum that discards narrative structure also discards some 
of our convictions about law. 
In a culture flooded with data that never crystallizes into 
distinct and particular stories, with images of images, with clichés 
that derive their inspiration from other clichés, law, like 
everything else, becomes meaningless.  When law merges into the 
hyper-real-domains Web, what follows is the disintegration of 
 
71 JEAN BAUDRILLARD, AMERICA 124 (Chris Turner trans., 1999) (1986). 
72 Id. 
73 FRANCO MORETTI, THE WAY OF THE WORLD: THE BILDUNGSROMAN IN EUROPEAN 
CULTURE 16 (Albert Sbragia trans., 1987). 
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legal generative narratives, and the breakthrough of the borders 
that define functional narratives.  Consequently, this affects the 
ability to take normative stands and assess situations morally and 
emotionally. 
Richard Sherwin, in a work focusing upon the influence of 
popular culture on law, describes the effects on legal reality of the 
incessant flow of images, recycled from network to network: 
They conjure a world robbed of personality, motivation, 
intentionality, and a story robbed of a structure that allows 
the listener to make sense of human actions and 
interactions.  Such psychological fatality is intolerable to 
thosejudges, jurors, lawyers, victims, suspects, 
spectators, and media producerswho face the laws 
demand for public judgment.  Without coherent stories, 
judgment becomes impossible.74 
Indeed, the diminished use of narrative as a way of perceiving law 
predates the Internet.  However, the Rule of Web accentuates 
such a process and carries it to an extreme. 
First, because the Internet is a sprawling medium that expands 
uncontrollably in all directions, it produces more simulacra than 
ever before.  This inescapable, uncontrollable vastness, this 
overdose of simulacra, creates the difference and affects culture in 
unfamiliar ways.  Within the flood of simulacra, the narratives of 
law turn into empty, powerless images. 
Internet users differ in another way from mass media 
consumers; they are not necessarily passive.  Many of them make 
the Web wider while consuming it.75  They are not only users, but 
also interpreters and creators of additional virtual simulacra.  The 
immense hypertext to which we are constantly exposed, the global 
 
74 RICHARD K. SHERWIN, WHEN LAW GOES POP: THE VANISHING LINE BETWEEN LAW 
AND POPULAR CULTURE 130 (2000). 
75 One example of the interactivity that characterizes the Web experience is the 
Weblogs phenomenon.  Weblogs are personal Web sites for expressing feelings and 
sharing songs, poems, artwork, and thoughts.  Today, there are about a half-million 
Weblogs and a new blogger is joining every 40 seconds.  Bloggers motives included 
need for attention, a mania to share information, and, above all, a desire to be a 
participant and not a potato. See Steven Levy, Living in the Blog, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 26, 
2002, at 4445. 
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electronic data flow, affects the ability to develop narrative 
knowledge of reality.  As a result, the ability to use evaluative, 
emotional, and critical reflection is influenced.  Furthermore, there 
is a possible link between the decline of story phenomena and two 
significant Internet-related issues.  First is the way in which 
research engines influence the way we think about law.  Second is 
the accumulating difficulty in applying existing law in the Internet. 
Lexis and Westlaw, as well as other electronic networks that 
serve the legal profession, are emblematic of the electronic 
revolution.76  Those devices dramatically transform the ways in 
which we produce legal insights, answers, and information.  In pre-
Internet days, when we sought knowledge relevant to a specific 
legal issue, we were required to go to libraries, where we looked 
for relevant stories.  Often, we had to initially determine the story 
of a case, and then advance by looking for relevantly similar 
stories.  Mastering such techniques required time and experience, 
and was often rewarded with serendipitous insights and broad, 
intricate observations. 
Computerized search techniques changed all of this.  If the 
contemporary researcher wants to explore, for instance, the links 
between constitutional law and tort law, she will not consider 
narratives in which those two doctrines intersect.  She will not 
search for the core story of constitutional tort and how it differs 
from the one of constitutional rights.  She will, instead, type some 
key words, such as constitution and tort, and then command the 
computerized search engine to initiate its rapid Web search.  One 
problem is the random nature of the results she will generate 
because the vastness of the Web dictates that search engines are 
only able to cover a fraction of it.77  In this sense, using the Internet 
in order to obtain certain information is similar to casual surfing
in both cases the interaction with the Web manifests a haphazard 
quality.  Furthermore, most computer searches use Boolean logic.  
Michael Heim explains the consequences: 
 
76 Richard A. Lanham, The Electronic Word: Literary Study and the Digital 
Revolution, 20 NEW LITERARY HIST. 265, 272 (1989). 
77 See Steve Laurence & Lee Giles, Accessibility and Distribution of Information on the 
Web, at http://www.wwwmetrics.com (last visited Sept. 28, 2002).  1999 research by 
NEC reveals that mechanisms cover only 16% of the Webs pages. 
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When we pose a question to the Boolean world, we use 
keywords, buzzwords, and thought bits to scan the vast 
store of knowledge.  Keeping an abstract, cybernetic 
distance from the sources of knowledge, we set up tiny 
funnels to capture the onrush of data.  The funnels sift out 
the hits triggered by our keywords. . . .  We cover an 
enormous amount of material in an incredibly short time, 
but what we see comes through narrow thought channels.78 
The narrow thought channels created by the computerized 
searches do not exhibit the relevant stories; they run through 
stories, distorting them or missing them altogether. 
Highly available Internet search engines keep us away from 
book libraries, which hold unsystematic, unfiltered collections of 
stories.  These stories are the essence and logic of law, and we 
cannot afford to give them up.  A research study constructed from 
Internet search result could be inherently impaired because it lacks 
the active intervention of imagination that is evoked, among other 
things, by narratives.79  That is not to say that we should discount 
legal search engines altogether, or that a well-tuned search cannot 
produce adequate findings.  But if we want to benefit from the 
 
78 Michael Heim, Logic and Intuition, in COMPUTERS AND ETHICS IN THE CYBERAGE 81 
(D. Micah Hester & Paul J. Ford eds., 2001). 
79 Compare Theodore Roszaks notions about necessity of keeping clear borders 
between ideas and information: 
It is only when we strike a clear distinction between ideas and information that 
we can recognize that these are radically different levels of discourse requiring 
different levels of evaluation.  In most cases, we may be able to assess the data 
that flow through the program as either right or wrong, a question of fact 
that yields to standard research methods.  But the ideas that govern the data are 
not information; nor are they sacrosanct matters of mathematical logic.  They 
are philosophical commitments, the outgrowth of experience, insight, 
metaphysical conviction, which must be assessed as wise or foolish, childlike 
or mature, realistic or fantastic, moral or wicked.  That critical project spans the 
full range of computer software, from the video game that places the fanciful 
annihilation of a galaxy beneath the power of a childs thumb to the 
computerized war machine that places the real choice of genocide before our 
presidents and generals. . . .  The computer can do no better than the quality of 
the information selected by a human intelligence to be entered into it. 
 Theodore Roszak, Computers and Reason, in COMPUTERS AND ETHICS IN THE CYBERAGE 
73 (D. Micah Hester & Paul J. Ford eds., 2001). 
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reservoir of voices and thoughts embedded in stories, we cannot 
rely on Internet searches as our sole provider of knowledge.80 
The other issues worth considering in the context of the schism 
between Internet and narrative are the practical and theoretical 
difficulties often encountered while trying to apply traditional legal 
concepts in Cyberspace.  Those difficulties are related not only to 
practical issues, such as the problem to enforce legal norms in 
Cyberspace, but also to conceptual failure: the inability to 
accommodate some of our secondary generative narratives in 
virtual spaces. Consider, for instance, the conventional template 
narratives of intellectual property, which stem from traditional 
conceptions of authorship and the presence of an identifiable 
creator, e.g., artist, author, painter, or actor, whose rights we wish 
to protect, in certain aspects.  But, as Landow points out, 
contemporary technology both extends conventional conceptions 
of intellectual property and makes its protection almost 
inconceivable.81  He quotes, in this context, the testimony of 
Steven W. Gilbert before a congressional committee: When 
almost any kind of information in almost any medium can now 
be represented and processed with digital electronics, the range of 
things that can be considered intellectual property is mind-
boggling.82 
This mind-boggling condition we experience does not 
necessitate relinquishing intellectual property laws.  Yet, it does 
demand new conceptions of copyrights and new compatible 
secondary generative narratives.  The old narrative relates to 
neither the economic volume nor the influence of modern Internet 
innovators, e.g., Microsoft and similar large corporations, nor to 
the rights of millions of individuals to free access and fair use.  It is 
 
80 See PETER B. MAGGS ET AL., INTERNET AND COMPUTER LAW (3d ed. 2000) 
(considering whether there is such a subject as Internet and Computer law).  A recent 
Westlaw search for the word Internet found 1,262 cases in the allfeds database and 
391 cases in allstates.  A similar search for shoe found 28,269 federal and 37,0373 
state cases. Id.  The authors describe the misleading nature of this data.  By itself it might 
indicate that  shoes are a much more significant legal story than Internet.  This data 
does imply that there is not anything peculiar about shoes, and that there is, on the other 
hand, special nature that characterizes the Internet cases. 
81 LANDOW, supra note 5, at 197. 
82 Id. 
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not feasible to address the current situation by means of the 
traditional intellectual rights narrative, which focuses upon the 
need to protect an individual artist or innovator laboring in their 
attics.  John Perry Barlow states that  there will be no property in 
Cyberspace since [n]o law can be successfully imposed on a 
huge population that does not morally support it.83  Others 
anticipate the emergence of new generative narratives that will 
capture the complexity of the current situations.  Richard Landow, 
in order to reach such a novel story, evokes memories of an old 
onethe narrative of feudalism: Thus dividing the world into the 
informationally rich and informationally impoverished, one may 
add, would produce a kind of techno-feudalism in which those 
with access to information and information technology would rule 
the world from electronic fiefdoms.84  In this context, Landow 
also points to the movie Blade Runner, in which giant corporations 
control information and power.85  Images borrowed from ancient 
narratives are juxtaposed alongside those from modern science 
fiction narratives to promote the conception of a new class of 
copyright that protects the rights of authors while taking into 
account emerging needs. 
B. Law, Web, and Borders 
Another legal difficulty in Cyberspace is the dissolution of 
territorial borders.  Until the advent of the Internet, all legal stories, 
 
83 John P. Barlow, The Next Economy of Ideas, at www.wired.com/wired/archive/8.10/ 
download.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2002).  It is interesting to note the way Barlow uses 
narrative in order to promote his standing.  He illustrates the paradigm shattering nature 
of the Napster affair, by looking at the American colonist liberation narrative: Whats 
happening with global, peertopeer networking is not altogether different from what 
happened when the American colonists realized they were poorly served by the British 
Crown: The colonists were obliged to cast off that power and develop an economy better 
suited to their new environment. Id. at *1.  It is problematic to lean on the colonist 
narrative in order to conclude that there will be no property in the cyberspace, because 
Barlow ignores certain ensuing developments of this narrative.  In fact, the American 
colonists did not sail into a lawless future after detaching themselves from the English 
crown.  They merely exchanged one system of legal sovereignty for another, one 
constituted independently to suit their needs and supported by new generative narratives.  
A similar course might evolve in the Internet environment. 
84 LANDOW, supra note 5, at 199. 
85 BLADE RUNNER (Columbia TriStar Films 1982). 
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generative and functional, shared a common attribute of occurring 
in certain locations, within certain borders.  The Internet 
experience distorts the perceptions of locations and borders, which 
are essential to law and legal stories.  Inevitably, generative and 
functional narratives firmly established upon the conception of 
borders are no longer effective.  Discussed above, the metaphor of 
a narrative map designates distinguishable narrative spaces in the 
legal field and manifests the ways in which law and narrative 
continuously intertwine.  Johnson and Post suggest the metaphor of 
a political map of the world that reflects geographical borders 
between nation-states and other political entities.86  There has 
been, until now, a general correspondence and overlap between a 
law map, which delineates areas where different rules apply to 
particular behaviors, and both the narrative map, and the 
political map.87  As Johnson and Post indicate, clusters of 
homogenous applicable law and legal institutions fit . . . within 
existing physical borders,88 just as different modes of narrative 
overlap certain areas of law.  Yet, this is no longer true in either 
case.  The Internet exists everywhere, but nowhere in particular, 
and as such, the narrative cognizance declines.  Similarly, the 
notions of borders and national and international sovereignty are 
impaired: Global computer-based communications cut across 
territorial borders, creating a new realm of human activity and 
undermining the feasibilityand legitimacyof laws based on 
geographic boundaries.89 Again, in both cases one can assume 
that new rules, motivated and bolstered by fresh narrative modes, 
narrative capacities, and novel narrative templates, will emerge and 
redefine borders, spaces, rights, and property templates.90 
 
86 David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and BordersThe Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 
48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1368 (1996). 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 1. 
90 See NICHOLAS BLOMELY ET AL., THE LEGAL GEOGRAPHIES READER, at xiiv (2001). 
Narratives are used, even now, in order to grasp conceptual difficulties created by 
Cyberspace.  Thus, Blomley, Delaney, and Ford turn to stories to demonstrate the 
challenge Cyberspace poses to both the theory and the practice of international legal 
sovereignty.  They parallel the 1884 Mignonette tragedy, Regina v. Dudley & Stephens, 
14 Q.B.D. 273 (Eng. 1884) (the trial of crew members who killed a cabin boy on the high 
seas in order to survive), with a 1999 legal narrative about a Florida teenager who sent a 
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Recently, Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et 
LAntisemitisme91 revealed certain obstacles. Yahoo! asked the 
United States District Court for the Northern District Court of 
California to bar enforceability of a French judgment which 
ordered Yahoo! to block the access of Nazi material,92 available 
from Yahoos major site in California, from French Web users in 
France.  The French ordinance did not consider the United States 
Constitution and the rights it endows, but the American court 
decided that the French ordinance was incompatible with the First 
Amendment.93  This decision demonstrates the kind of difficulties 
inherent in the application of basic narrative templates within 
Cyberspace when relying upon traditional perceptions of 
sovereignty and borders. 
Internet-related practices may distort stories and may affect our 
narrative cognizance.  Yet, narrative cognizance is the tool we 
must preserve and nurture to face and manage some of the new 
legal challenges created by the Internet.  To illuminate this point 
further and conclude, let us return now to Borges El Aleph. 
The emotional and cognitive responses of the two central 
characters reflect human response to the Web-like Aleph.  Carlos 
Argentino Daneri represents a lifetime of constant exposure to the 
Aleph.  The result in his case is mental activity that was 
continuous, deeply felt, far ranging andall in all
 
threat message to an online chat room.  These stories explicate and address the 
fundamental question, where is law? 
91 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (N.D. Cal. 2001). 
92 Licra v. Yahoo!, TGI Paris, Interim Order No. 00/05308, Nov. 20, 2001, available at 
http://www.cdt.org/speech/international/001120yahoofrance.pdf. 
93 Judge Fogel concluded: 
Yahoo! seeks a declaration from this Court that the First Amendment precludes 
enforcement within the United States of a French order intended to regulate the 
content of its speech over the Internet.  Yahoo! has shown that the French order 
is valid under the laws of France, that it may be enforced with retroactive 
penalties, and that the ongoing possibility of its enforcement in the Unites 
States chills Yahoo!s First Amendment rights.  Yahoo! also has shown that an 
actual controversy exists and that the threat to its constitutional rights is real 
and immediate.  Defendants have failed to show the existence . . . of a genuine 
issue of material fact . . . .  Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment will 
be granted. 
Yahoo!, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 1194. 
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meaningless.94  For years he had been toiling over the 
composition of a poem called The Earth.  In this significant 
undertaking, Daneri attempts to set to verse the entire face of the 
planet,95 without excluding a single detail.  The Aleph is the 
source of inspiration for this vast and entirely redundant project.  
In effect, he simply cuts and pastes thousands of fragments from 
the Aleph and transforms them into a simulacrum.  This process 
suppresses any creative growth, as creativeness is replaced by an 
obsessive, Sisyphean attempt to capture totality, and replicate 
shreds of it.  The product is worthless because it offers mere 
simulation without genuine presentation or rendition of the 
original. 
Borges, as a character in the story (as well as in real life), 
represents the opposite experience.  In his first encounter with the 
Aleph, Borges confronts the rotted dust and bones that had once 
deliciously been Beatriz Viterbo,96 together with a pack of 
Spanish playing cards, . . . tigers, pistons, bison, tides and 
armies,97  Each item in this infinite circle loses its uniqueness and 
becomes identical to the others.  Yet, after the initial shock and 
infinite wonder, infinite pity,98 of his first encounter with the 
Aleph, the emotional response becomes blunted.  The 
disappearance of differences breeds indifference.  The exposure to 
the Aleph causes emotional paralysis because it damages the 
specific and particular quality that characterizes every experience: 
Out on the street, going down the stairways . . . riding the 
subway, every one of the faces seemed familiar to me.  I 
was afraid that not a single thing on earth would ever again 
surprise me; I was afraid I would never again be free of all 
I had seen.99 
The infinity of links also signifies the absence of any context and 
entails the dullness of significant emotional response.  Borges 
retreats from the Aleph, denying to Daneri what he has seen, and 
 
94 Borges, supra note 3, at 1617. 
95 Id. at 19. 
96 Id. at 28. 
97 Id. at 27. 
98 Id. at 28. 
99 Id. at 2829. 
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does not return to it.  He tries to forget it, and after a few sleepless 
nights, he succeeds. 
Does Borges refusal to surf represent a technophobic fear of 
a new technology and his inability to control it and tame it, or does 
it represent the survival impulse and the sober realization of human 
limitations?  The Borgesian flight from the Aleph signifies, among 
other things, the dire need to preserve our ability to create and 
maintain narrative constructs: the vehicles that transform 
meaningless data into organized, meaningful templates, or into 
stories.  This enables us to preserve the symbolic authority and 
routine functioning of the rule of law. 
CONCLUSION: THE SAME FEW PLOTS . . . 
The same few plots, I am sorry to say, have pursued me down 
through the years, writes the septuagenarian Borges.100  The 
secret of narrative is embedded in the human capacity to use and 
reuse our basic narratives to create new stories, whatever the 
endeavorlaw, literature, film, or any other.  In this first decade of 
the third millennium, Cyberspace raises many questions and 
dilemmas about law, culture, power, and creativity.  In order to 
grasp, assess, and address these questions, which may be new, we 
still need stories that are rooted in our personal and collective 
memories. 
The relationships between Internet, narrative, and law are 
highly dynamic and diffuse.  It is too early to conclude that the 
Internet will become either lawless or storyless.  It is possible to 
presume, however, that the Internet will promote significant 
changes in the ways we use stories and the ways we understand 
law.  Traditional generative and functional narratives will not be 
altogether abandoned, but perhaps transformed dramatically.  In 
time, the Web might produce its own generative narratives linked 
to novel legal doctrines.  If narratives are representations of human 
possibilities, they will inevitably respond to our urgent needs.  
Actually, that is one of the unique characterizations of the narrative 
 
100 JORGE LUIS BORGES, DOCTOR BRODIES REPORT 10 (Norman Thomas di Giovanni 
trans., 1972) (1970). 
1-ALMOG FORMAT 12/12/02 12:20 PM 
2002] CYBERSPACE, NARRATIVE, AND LAW 33 
modeits capacity to ignite shifts of thought and practice.  
Perhaps the Napster,101 Microsoft,102 and Yahoo!103 affairs and 
their yet unknown sequels will provide the preliminary sources of 
the next legally generative stories. 
Be that as it may, stories and plots will remain as vital for law 
as they are for many other social institutions.  Since the Internet is 
here to stay, one can anticipate a process that will modify our 
narrative capacities and needs and connect them to the rule of the 
Web.104  Imagination can take us to undreamed-of regions.  Human 
ingenuity, combined with imagination, transferred us all into the 
realm of the Internet.  In order to navigate safely within the space 
of this novel, fictive-like realm, to perceive beginnings and ends, 
and to maintain law, we must use stories as our oars and anchors.  
Although the Internet has an outstanding contemporary quality, the 
pertinent conflict between chaos and construct is not novel.  The 
vision of erecting a city, and a tower whose top may reach into 
heaven,105 in which the people is one, and they have all one 
language,106 has deep roots in human mythology.  It is the vision 
 
101 See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., No. C 99-05183, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
2186 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2001). 
102 See Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
103 Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et LAntisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d 
1181 (N.D. Cal. 2001). 
104 See JANET H. MURRAY, HAMLET ON THE HOLODECK: THE FUTURE OF NARRATIVE IN 
CYBERSPACE (1997) (envisioning a cyberbard, a future storyteller who is half hacker, 
half bard, that will carry literary imagination into unknown territories).  New insights 
and new ways to organize knowledge and thought in the Internet era are sought 
constantly. See generally Nick Bingham, Unthinkable Complexity? Cyberspace 
Otherwise, in VIRTUAL GEOGRAPHIES: BODIES, SPACE AND RELATIONS 244 (Mike Crang, 
et al. eds., 1999); CYBERSPACE, CYBERBODIES, CYBERPUNK: CULTURES OF 
TECHNOLOGICAL EMBODIMENT (Mike Featherstone & Roger Burrows eds., 1995); Marcus 
A. Doel & David B. Clarke, Virtual Worlds: Simulation, Suppletion, S(ed)uction and 
Simulacra, in VIRTUAL GEOGRAPHIES: BODIES, SPACE AND RELATIONS 261 (Mike Crang, 
et al. eds., 1999); DONNA J. HARAWAY, MODEST_WITNESS@SECOND_MILLENNIUM. 
FEMALEMAN©_MEETS_ONCOMOUSE: FEMINISM AND TECHNOSCIENCE (1997); Otto 
Imken, The Convergence of Virtual and Actual in the Global Matrix: Artificial Life, Geo
Economics and Psychogeography, in VIRTUAL GEOGRAPHIES: BODIES, SPACE AND 
RELATIONS 92 (Mike Crang et al. eds., 1999); DAVID R. KOEPSELL, THE ONTOLOGY OF 
CYBERSPACE: PHILOSOPHY, LAW, AND THE FUTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2000); 
PAUL VIRILIO, THE AESTHETICS OF DISAPPEARANCE (Philip Beichtman trans., 1991) 
(1980). 
105 Genesis 11:4. 
106 Id. at 11:6. 
1-ALMOG FORMAT 12/12/02 12:20 PM 
34 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 13:1 
of controlling totality, which is often juxtaposed with the 
nightmare of drowning in a limitless vastness. 
The illustrated discord between the rule of the Web and the 
loss of the story is a present-day echo of that ancient meta-story: 
the annihilation of borders endangers the ability to perceive clearly 
defined segments of reality, and potentially leads towards a 
situation in which human beings may not understand one 
anothers speech.107  When all stories become one, they become 
none.  However, as one interpretation of that ancient tale suggests, 
a between the elements of narrative and of chaos must be reached, 
and therefore is always reached. 
 
107 Id. at 11:7. 
